US State Department Country Report

 

1991 US State Department Country Report. January 1992

YUGOSLAVIA

The Yugoslavia of 1991 bears little resemblance to the one established by the 1914 Constitution that set up a Federal State comprising six republics (with two autonomous regions in the republic of Serbia) and a collective Federal Presidency as the supreme state organ. Effective civilian federal authority collapsed in 1991 as the republics and various independence movements decisively rejected that authority and escalating ethnic animosities propelled the country into a vicious armed conflict.

The Federal Government?s attempts to introduce multiparty elections at the federal level and to advance economic reforms were blocked by republic governments. Several republics adopted legislation and new constitutions that gave primacy to republic-. level rather than to federal laws and routinely ignored federal legislation. Blocked by Serbia in their attempts to restructure Yugoslavia as a loose confederation, the republics of Croatia and Slovenia on June 25 declared complete independence and sought international recognition. In walking out of the Federal Assembly (legislature), they effectively denied it a quorum. In October Serbia end its allies in the Federal Presidency assumed the right to act in the name of the Presidency and to take over the Federal Assembly?s authority. Federal Prime Minister Markovic. a Croat, lost effective power and finally resigned in December after Serbian—dominated rump federal institutions sought his ouster. In December Stipe Mesic. the President of the Federal Presidency and a Croat, resigned his office.

The breakdown of federal authority seriously compromised the principle of federal civilian control over the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) which, along with elements of other security and police forces, technically remained under federal civilian jurisdiction in 1991. After its nominal Commander in Chief, the collective Federal Presidency, became paralyzed, the JNA allied itself squarely with Serbian politicians in the armed conflict with Croatia.

The size and activities of other military, paramilitary, and police units increased dramatically in 1991, including those of the Croatian army and the irregular units organized by Serbian residents of Croatia. The outbreak of fighting between these groups and the aggressive role of the JNA in support of these Serbs led to many civilian casualties, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons from the war—torn areas, and widespread brutality and disregard of the Geneva Conventions and other international norms.

In the economy, the workers self—management system, which purported to enable workers to run their own enterprises through elected workers? councils, is being phased out. The Federal Government?s economic reform program4 aimed at converting to a market system and encouraging private enterprise, started promisingly in 1990 but collapsed under high inflation, plummeting production, and growing unemployment that were aggravated by the fracturing of the economy along republic and ethnic lines. The National Bank of Yugoslavia resorted to printing money and extending large credits to the Federal Government to finance its growing expenditures, primarily to support the military.

Respect for human rights deteriorated drastically in the deepening political crisis and the breakdown of civil order. Extreme interrepublic and ethnic animosities and the spread of armed conflict undid 1990?s promising advances in human rights and brought about serious new human rights violations. The armed conflict claimed thousands of lives by year?s end, including those of many civilian noncombatants. In the areas most affected by the fighting., there wore widespread and credible reports of atrocities, including the massacre of villagers, the killing of prisoners, the use of human shields. and the taking of hostages. Such behavior was rarely punished. Croats and Serbs both fled areas of Croatia that came under the control of the other ethnic group4

In the autonomous province of Kosovo, Serbian authorities intensified repressive measures against the majority Albanian population, eliminating virtually all Albanian—language schooling. They arrested and beat hundreds of Albanians on trumped-up charges and suppressed the Albanian cormiunity?s attempt to organiEe a referendum on Kosovo?s future. In March Serbian police and army troops in Belgrade used force to repress large-scale opposition demonstrations to demand the Serbian government?s ouster, resulting in two deaths and hundreds of injuries.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a.Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Political killings occurred with increasing frequency in 1991, spurred by violent rivalry between political and ethnic groups and the breakdown in civil order. Serbs and Croats regularly accused each other of “massacres? and “genocide” against innocent civilians (see Section i.g.). While both sides were prone to exaggerate for propaganda purposes and hard evidence was often scarce, the statements of those fleeing the fighting and other evidence make clear that many deaths resulted from sumary executions on ethnic or political grounds. For example, some 80 Croatian residents of the town of Dalj were reportedly massacred in August. At least 35 Croats, mostly elderly, in the Croatian village of Vocin, were murdered and mutilated in December, apparently by Serbian irregular forces. Displaced persons alleged that in at least one instance Croatian journalists who witnessed the killing of Croatian civilians by Serbian irregulars were themselves executed. There were also credible reports of Croatian forces killing unarmed Serbian villagers in the Sisak area and in Sarvas. In a Croatian village near Glina, Serbian irregulars reportedly murdered 21 Croatian civilians aged between S and 65; Serbian authorities in the area acknowledged the incident and promised to investigate. There is no reliable way to ascertain the number of such killings.

In an armed conflict with constantly shifting battle lines and weakening civil authority throughout the country, there were numerous reports of killings in areas not related to the fighting. For example, two Muslims were shot in Bosnia, apparently by Serbs angered by Muslim resistance to conscription. A number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo died at the hands of police or the army; nine ethnic Albanians residing in a contested area of Croatia were reportedly murdered by Serbian irrequlars in November. Several Croatian policemen were arrested in Pula in connection with the murder of a Serb.

b.Disappearance

There were many reports of disappearances, particularly in the areas of Croatia which experienced the heaviest fighting and produced the greatest numbers of displaced persons. The Croatian governnient reported at year?s end that 30,000 persons were missing in Croatia,, a situation exacerbated by the chaotic breakdown of connunications links within and between republics. This figure included not only Croats but also cases such as the 24 ethnic Serbs abducted by masked men in Gospic in October. Two Soviet journalists disappeared in September and were never located. In the Sandzak region of Serbia, six Muslim draft resisters who were arrested in December are missing. More than one hundred Croatian residents of the village of Hum were reported ?disappeared? after Serbian irregular forces withdrew from the area.

c.Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Yugoslav law forbids torture, but prisoners in many parts of Yugoslavia are beaten and otherwise mistreated during arrest and detention. This practice is most widespread in Kosovo, where Serbian police engage in frequent and- flagrant abuse of people arrested on suspicion of participating in unsanctioned activity. Hundreds of instances of Serbian nolice detaining and severely beating ethnic Albanians were reported in 1991 .-In the areas affected by armed conflict, there were convincing reports that police, military, and irregular armed units engaged in severe beatings of persons, sometimes resulting in their deaths. There were credible reports that local Serbian forces operating in Croatia routinely tortured their detainees, including civilian noncombatants, using electric shocks. Serbian political and community leaders were reportedly regularly detained and sometimes beaten by Croatian police in contested areas in order to intimidate the local Serbian population. In Augutt the Federal Minister of Agriculture was detained and beaten by Croatian security forces while driving in Croatia. Croatian President Tudjman condemned the attack, but those responsible were not prosecuted.

In apparently only one instance were offenders prosecuted for the excessive use of force. In Macedonia. two policemen were arrested and charged with the death by besting of an ethnic Albanian.

In Serbia antiwar activists and opposition figures received death threats from known radical Serbian paramilitary groups.

Most of those detained and abused in the context of the armed conflict were held in makeshift places of detainment which often did not meet minimum humanitarian standards for life and health as specified in the Geneva accords.

d.Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Yugoslav criminal law and legal procedures include many provisions inconsistent with internationally accepted human rights norms. The federal law allows investigatory detention for up to 3 months, with a possible 3—month extension. Access to prisoners in pretrial detention is sometimes restricted, ostensibly to prevent interference with investigations.

Arbitrary arrest continued to occur frequently in Kosovo in 1991. Ethnic Albanians were routinely and sunrnarily sentenced to 30 to 60 days in Jail, often on misdemeanor charges of? ?disturbing public order? on the basis of an unsupported statement by a single policeman. Although the numbers affected appeared to be lower than the thousands reported in 1990, arrest and imprisonment in this manner continues to be frequent in Kosovo. Under judicial procedures pertaining to misdemeanors, a prisoner may appeal a conviction only after sentencing, and, because of the time required to file the appeal, the sentence is often completed before the appeal can be heard. Because of the speed of the trial and sentencing, defendants often cannot obtain legal assistance, although they have the legal right to an attorney.

Arbitrary detention with little or no attention to procedural safeguards occurred with growing frequency in the areas of Croatia most affected by armed conflict. In numerous cases Croatian authorities detained politically active Serbs, usually for several hours or days, occasionally longer. For example, flomir Lazic, a Serbian opposition leader in the Croatian city of Karlovac. was arrested with three others in April and released 1 day later. Lazic claimed he was beaten during detention and pressed charges against the Croatian authorities.

In areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina which came under the control of Serbian paramilitary and irregular units, virtually no safeguards against arbitrary detention existed. These units, together with serbian police, regularly detained persons without charge and without the safeguards of due process, such as the right to a hearing and legal representation. Three American Journalists were so detained by the police of the so—called Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina in flay. After the JNA captured the Croatian city of Vukovar in November, it took over 2.000 prisoners, including children, medical personnel. and clergy, and held them in a variety of overcrowded facilities. Although many. including the doctors from the Vukovar hospital and the women and children, were eventually released, the JNA continued to hold a large number of captured adult men. Hundreds. perhaps thousands, of Yugoslav civilians were arbitrarily detained and denied due process in these areas in 1991.

e.Denial of Fair Public Trial

The court system comprises local, district. provincial, and supreme courts at the republic level, and a Federal Supreme Court to which republic supreme court decisions may be appealed. There is also a federal military court system. The Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and regulations, but its rulings must be enforced by the republic authorities, who in 1991 routinely ignored them. The republics are obliged to follow federal criminal procedure, but the Federal Government is powerless to compel them to do so. Ref orms proposed in 1991 to the federal system to provide for due process rights in greater conformity with international standards were not adopted because the Federal Assembly was not functioning normally.

Under federal law, defendants have the right to be present at their trials and to have an attorney, at public expense if needed. The legal system, however, still contains numerous inequities unfavorable to the defendant, regardless of whether the offense alleged is criminal or political. The defense is sometimes restricted in the time allowed to prepare its case.

While the prosecution may call as witnesses whomever it wishes. the defendant may only request the court to call witnesses, and the court has complete discretion as to whether or not to honor tb. request. Prosecutors are allowed to appeala verdict of not guilty.

Although the major changes made in federal and republic legal systems in 1990 provided greater due process protection, the breakdown or nonfunctioning of legitimate authority and of the rule of law in many parts of Yugoslavia resulted in widespread denials of due process, particularly in those areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where ethnic Serbs declared local autonomy and rejected republic authority over their regions. These denials of due process and persecution for political offenses extended to ethnic Serbs in opposition to the Serbian group in power as well as to members of other ethnic groups.

Thousands of noncombatants were imprisoned in the context of the armed conflict often but not always for relatively brief periods and usually without any form of due process. In October it was estimated that some 2.500 such persons. including prisoners of war, were being detained at any given time. Noncombatants were detained because of the ethnic group to which they belonged, because of suspected political activities or sympathies, or as hostages. -The judiciary is not free of political influence nor of ethnic bias. In the republic of Serbia. provincial courts in Kosovo and Vojvodina were closed, and some of their functions were transferred to Belgrade. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanian judges were replaced by ethnic Serbs and Monteneqrins. who were said by ethnic Albanians to be unqualified, inexperienced, and anti— Albanian, Ethnic Athenians in the republic of Macedonia also charged that courts there are often biased against them. In September Nevzat Halili leader of the largest ethnic Albanian party in Macedonia. was sentenced to 60 days imprisonment for refusing to cooperate in the federal census, an accusation and trial which occurred months after the census had ended. The sentence was later reduced to a fine.

Offenses by those in the armed forces or offenses by civilians deemed to affect national security are tried in the federal military court system. In 1991 the Croatian Minister of Defense and several other Croatian defendants were charged with national security violations in connection with efforts to arm a Croatian force. The Minister of Defense, with the support of the Croatian government, evaded arrest. The other defendants. tried in military court, alleged that they were not permitted to have their lawyers present during interrogation nor to inspect prosecution—held documents; they were convicted on some charges.

Changes made in the federal criminal code by the Federal Assembly in 1990 narrowed the definitions of statutes regarding political crimes. Thanks to these legal revisions, a number of long—term political prisoners were released in 1991. Yugoslav federal sources claimed that the 15 still imprisoned were guilty of acts of violence. Other sources estimated the number of political prisoners in mid—1991 at several hundred, including a large number of ethnic Albanians imprisoned on such grounds as “endangering the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

f.Arbitrary Interference with Privacy. Family. Home, or Correspondence

Government efforts to monitor opposition or dissident activity and the widening military conflict brought about increased arbitrary interference in private life in 1991. Although federal and republic-level constitutions and laws, including Serbia?s. include restrictions on arbitrary searches, these safeguards were often ignored, particularly in Kosovo and in areas of Croatia and Bosnia experiencing the most severe civil unrest. Authorities eavesdropped on conversations, read private mail, and taRpod telephones in some cases. For example, ethnic Croats in Vojvodina, an autonomous province of Serbia. complained that Serbian authorities there were tapping the telephones of opposition party leaders and searching Croatian households under the pretext of looking for weapons. Serbian residents of some Croatian areas complained that Croatian authorities conducted unlawful searches of Serbian households, The pattern of frequent, arbitrary police raids on homes and people in Kosovo continued in 1991.

Faced with growing resistance to callups for military service, the JNA in 1.991 increasingly resorted to extraordinary measures to round up recruits, including nighttime sweeps of restaurants and homes and, in some cases, impressment of eligible males who had not received callup notices. The threat of mobilization was used on numerous occasions to intimidate antiwar activists. For example, Vojvodina antiwar leader Nedad Canak was arrested and then turned over to the JNA for conscription, though he was demobilized some weeks later. Draft resisters were threatened with dismissal from their Jobs and with sentences to extended prison terms for draft evasion, as approved by the Serbian—rump Federal Presidency.

As part of Serbia?s plans after the armed conflict, Serbs dislocated by the war have been resettled in the homes and farms of Croats and ethnic Hungarians who fled when the JNA and Serbian insurgents seized and occupied those areas. Serbian officials in the occupied areas, asserting that the Croats and ethnic Hungarians had abandoned their properties. state that the owners will not be allowed to return to their homes.

g.Use of Excessive Force and ViolatiQns of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

Massive violations of humanitarian law occurred during the armed conflict. The JNA was increasingly aggressive in using its superior ground and air power on civilian targets. Its disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force, including heavy artillery and air strikes during the sieges of Vukovar, Osijek, Dubrovnik, and other Croatian population centers resulted in thousands of civilian casualties, severe damage or destruction to Croatian cities and villages, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents. It was estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 people died in the civil conflict in Croatia by December, many of them civilian noncombatants. In Slovenia about 100 persons were killed, including some 30 civilians, during fighting between the JNA and Slovene irregular forces in?July.

In many instances, forces involved in the conflict failed to observe humanitarian standards, notably in the treatment of prisoners. For example, in September Croatian forces near Karlovac reportedly killed more than 10 JNA soldiers who were attempting to surrender. Both Croatian and Serbian forces regularly beat prisoners. There were credible reports of Serbian irregular forces using civilian noncombatants as human shields. International observers reported widespread looting of Croatian villages by Serbian irregulars and JNA reservist. in the Dalmatian hinterlands. In September the government-controlled Belgrade television broadcast interviews with Croatian prisoners of war. The families of JNA soldiers residing in Croatia were threatened and at times used as hostages by Croatian forces. Members of opposing ethnic groups were captured and held as hostages for barter in prisoner exchanges. These instances of hostage—taking were in violation of humanitarian conventions. The Croatian blockade of JNA garrisons in Croatia resulted in the denial of essential food and supplies to some families and noncombatants.

Conventions protecting medical personnel and relief supplies were not respected. A convoy of medical and food supplies for the city of Vukovar. besieged by the JNA was repeatedly stopped in October. despite the agreement of all sides that it should proceed. The convoy was fired upon. allegedly by JNA forces. Mother convoy, led by the French organization. Doctors Without Borders, came under artillery attack while it was evacuating patients. In a separate incident, a clearly marked vehicle carrying delegates of the International Connittee of the Red Cross (lcRC) was attacked by mortar fire. In several instances, international cease—fire monitors were attacked. In numerous instances, including in Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci, and Karlovac, clearly identified hospitals were repeatedly and apparently intentionally hit by JNA and Serbian irregular artillery and air attacks. In October Serbian irregulars fired mortar rounds at a clearly marked ambulance near Karlovac and killed the doctor inside it.

During its June effort to reclaim control of border posts in Slovenia, the JNA admitted to several incidents in which it falsely used Red Cross markings on its vehicles. There is convincing evidence that Slovenian forces fighting the JNA also connitted numerous offenses, including firing on JNA medical personnel and denying wounded JNA soldiers access to medical treatment.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a.Freedom of Speech and Press

Yugoslav federal and republic laws provide for freedom of speech and press. Federal rules, laws, and institutions, however. became increasingly irrelevant in 1991. with the outbreak of the armed conflict, the governments of some republics enforced tighter controls on the press, mainly over coverage of domestic politics, the armed conflict, and allegations of human rights abuses, Although press freedom varied substantially from republic to republic, most areas of Yugoslavia generally had less press freedom in 1991 than they did in 1990.

Serbian and Croatian television increasingly presented only their government?s interpretation of events. The federally supported Tutel news network failed to get acceptable air time (it was shown after midnight in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia) before finally being taken off the air completely in four of the six republics. In Serbian—controlled areas of Croatia, Serbian or JNA forces systematically converted Croatian television retransmitters to receive only Serbian television.

Serbia adopted laws that increased its control over serbian-based media, including Belgrade Radio/Television. In August numerous senior editors at Belgrade Radio/Television were demoted or dismissed and replaced with Serbian ruling party loyalists. However, despite government restrictions. independent media in Belgrade, including Studio B television and radio. 0-92 radio, the major daily. Borba, and the weekly newsmagazine. Yreme. offered alternatives to the government— controlled media. Both 0-92 and Studio B were temporarily shut down by Serbian authorities for carrying live coverage of the demonstration on March 9 (see Section 2.b.). Growing nationalistic fervor gradually drew attention away from the issue of press freedom in Serbia. Nationalist politicians and government officials regularly accused the independent media of being anti—Serbian.

The minority media in Volvodina arid Kosovo came under strong Serbian pressure. In Vojvodina the Serbian government prevented the distributTon of a new independent Hungarian—language daily. In Kosovo the leading Albanian—language daily. Rilindja. _rarnained closed because its editors refused to agree to censorshiv bv&erbtan authorities as a condition for resuming publication. The only nongovernment sources of news in Albanian were magazines. In October several editors of Albanian— language magazines were summarily sentenced to 60 days? imprisonment on misdemeanor charges because they printed stories citing announcements by the banned ?Government of the Republic of Kosovo.?

In Croatia the movement towards independence and the siege mentality engendered by the armed conflict encouraged self— censorship in all media. In October a new decree affording the government greater potential powers over the press during wartime was introduced. Despite this decree and reports of government-imposed guidelines and loyalty oaths, the daily newspaper in Split maintained an independent editorial line, and major Zagreb dailies. including new newspapers such as Globus, did criticize the Croatian government. Croatian authorities took control of a newspaper in strife—torn Osijek because of its critical editorial line. The independent weekly Danas was subjected to apparently officially sanctioned financial and editorial pressures.

InMontenegro the media remained under government control and hewed to a progovernment line. The offices of the weekly magazine, Monitor, the only significant Independent publication, were bombed in October; the perpetrator was not found. Titograd television fired six journalists who had been contributing articles to the magazine. Montenegrin writer Jef rem Brkovic was charged in October with ?stirring up racial hatred,? apparently because of statements critical of the behavior of Montenegr in reservists in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In Macedonia government influence on the media was not heavy— handed although the government sponsors Macedonia Radio/ Television and the Nova Makedonija publishing house, which prints the major daily paper and most Macedonian—language magazines. A Bulgarian-language newspaper was reportedly denied permission to publish in Macedonia. In Slovenia, government control of news during the Slovenian—JNA conflict was an effective tool in its campaign to get the JNA out of Slovenia. As a result, many officials remained reluctant to abandon an oversight role, particularly in television. The director of Slovenia Television removed 14 journalists in September, allegedly for political reasons. At the same time, however, a new, independent Slovenian television station began broadcasting in 1991.

Although the major media in Dosnia-Herzegovina are under government sponsorship, the three ethnically based political parties continued to vie for control over them, and the Bosnian courts acted to restrain them.

Academic freedom and autonomy are being threatened by educational reform efforts that centralize decision making in the hands of government. During the summer, the Serbian legislature announced a draft university law that appeared to challenge the autonomy of universities. Serbian authorities effectively denied higher education to most ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1991.

b.Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Despite federal constitutional provisions for freedom of assembly and similar provisions at the republic level, permission for assemblies is often denied to opposition groups.

On March 9, Serbian police backed by army troops broke up an unauthorized opposition demonstration in Belgrade. which demanded initially the resignation of the head of Belgrade television and later the ouster of the Serbian government. Police and the army used tear gas, water cannons, and tanks to disperse the crowd of 40.000 to 50.000; one teenager and one policeman were killed and hundreds were injured in the violence. However. Belgrade authorities subsequently allowed other opposition gatherings, even those which had been officially ?banned.

In Kosovo practically any gatheringof ethnic Alhanians was likely to be broken up on the pretext that permission has not been obtained from the Serbian government or that the gathering has separatist aims. Serbian police routinely used tear gas and clubs against entirely peaceful crowds of Albanian demonstrators, causing hundreds of injuries and arrests through the year. Serbian authorities did not interfere with a peaceful opposition gathering of some 100,000 ethnic Albanians in June; however, a gathering of some 0.000 ethnic Albanians in September protesting Serbian educational policies at Pristina University was broken up by police using firearms and rubber truncheons. One demonstrator was killed. Police arrested several dozen participants to curb widespread protests against Serbian controls of local schools in October. on occasion, peaceful demonstrations against the armed conflict, such as that organized by ethnic Hungarian and Croatian residents of Vojvodina in September, were broken up by police; at other times, similar antiwar gatherings were permitted.

The legal basis for greater freedom of association. begun in 1990, remained in effect in 1991. In January 1991, there were 54 registered political parties in Serbia alone. The total for all of Yugoslavia numbered over 200.

There are still, however, serious restrictions on freedom of association under existing laws. The law against association for the purpose of hostile activities has been used to prosecute ethnic Albanians who advocate republic status for Kosovo. No organizations that ?stir up racial, ethnic, or religious hatred? are permitted, and no one who has been convicted of a crime may be a founder of a citizens? association. These provisions are frequently used by Serbian authorities to restrict the activities of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The Serbian election law deities registration to any party that does not accept the territorial integrity of Serbia, a provision that is aimed at Albanian political parties, almost all of which have sought separate status for Kosovo within Yugoslavia but outside Serbia. An ethnic Croatian political patty in Vojvodina complained that Serbian authorities had banned all public party meetings on security grounds. The Serbian government declared illegal referendums organized by opposition parties in Kosovo and Sandzak. In Kosovo, 68 people were arrested in this connection, and in Sandzak charges were filed against 5 political party leaders. The Serbian authorities later moved to ban the Sandzak-based party.

c.Freedom of Religion

In many respects, the substantial expansion in religious freedom achieved in 1990 was consolidated in 1991. While Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Roman Catholicism, and Islam aS the largest faiths in Yugoslavia, there is also a Jewish community of about 6.000 members and a small Protestant community which includes various denominations.

There are few hindrances for religious believers who wish to associate with their coreligionists elsewhere. Foreign clergy work and proselytize in Yugoslavia, though they sometimes experience difficulties in obtaining permits from the authorities. Religious institutions are allowed to propagate their beliefs and offer religious education. Soldiers are now allowed to possess religious materials.

Religion is identified with ethnicity in Yugoslavia. In the context of increasing ethnic animosities and armed conflict, the nationalist governments which came to power in 1990 in the republics have established close public ties with the dominant religious establishments and usually discriminated against minority religions. Senior Catholic and Serbian Orthodox clerics have taken political stands in support of the Croatian and Serbian government positions respectively. The minority Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia has complained of official discrimination in such areas as the issuance of building permits. it has protested the lack of police protection against the vandalism of Its churches in Croatia. including In some instances the use of explosives. There has been little official effort to identify and punish those responsible. Several Serbian priests in Croatia. including Bishop Lukijan of Pakrac, were reportedly placed wider house arrest or prevented from performing their duties freely. In August the Jewish community center in Zagreb was badly damaged by a bomb; the Government responded promptly with promises to investigate fully but by year?s end had not identified the culprits.

The Croatian government reported in December that 223 churches and monasteries in Croatia had been damaged or destroyed in the war. In addition to instances of vandalism by Serbian irregular forces operating in the area, the Croatian authorities accused the 381¼ of intentionally targeting Catholic churches in artillery and air attacks. Although the JHA denied this allegation and charged Croatian forces with staging attacks from churches and oilier civilian buildings, the testimony of numerous reliable international observers suggested that churches had been intentionally and repeatedly targeted. In July a Croatian Catholic priest in the Serbian—held town of old Tenja in Cr?atia reported lie was held hostage by Serbian forces. Four Franciscan priests were taken prisoner by the JNA when Vukovar tell.

Catholics in Vojvodtna claimed that Serbs who allegedly placed a bomb in Subotica?s Catholic Cathedral, though known to the police, went unpunished.

The construction of new places of worship requires the consent of local government authorities. Although in many cases building permits (or new religious facilities are nov easier to obtain, minority religions still (ace obstacles, The Islamic community has had a request pending for years to build a new mosque In Belgrade. In Split, a predominantly Catholic area, the Serbian Orthodox Church has long had difficulty in getting permission to complete its cathedral. For the most part. federal and republic authorities have not returned properties confiscated by the previous Comunist regime, though in Macedonia, for example, some properties have been transferred to the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

d.Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for freedom of movement within Yugoslavia, but the conditions of armed conflict and other factors have severely limited this right. Slovenia instituted entry controls on the Slovenian-Croatian border in October although it promised easy entry to holders of Yugoslav documentation. Travel became increasingly difficult as the Zagreb and LjublJana airports were closed, JNA units blockaded Adriatic ports, and various military forces shelled or threatened roads and train lines in Croatia and Bosnia.

Yugoslavs generally do not require exit permits, and passports are routinely available to most Yuqoslavs. Yuqoslav authorities in 1991, however, stepped up efforts to prevent draft-age males. particularly from Serbia, from leaving the country. In November federal authorities announced that draft-eligible men would need special permits to travel abroad. The Croatian government introduced the requirement that all draft—age males obtain permission before leaving their area of residence. Ethnic Albanians. particularly those who are politically active, continued to face restrictions on their ability to travel outside Yugoslavia. In August JNA border guards shot to death two Yugoslavs who were ethnic Albanians while they were attempting to cross the border into Albania. In several other cases. Yugoslav border guards killed or wounded persons along the Yugoslav-Albanian border, in one instance shooting an Albanian border guard and leaving him to bleed to death.

Reentry into Yugoslavia by Yugoslav citizens has not usually been a problem. Reports in 1991, however, indicate that ethnic Croats and Hungarians who had sought temporary refuge In Hungary from fighting or ethnic discrimination in Croatia and Vojvodina were at times prevented forcibly from returning to their homes. Refugees from Croatia interviewed in Hungary asserted that in some instances the population of entire villages of ethnic Hungarians or Croats had been forced at gunpoint by JNA or Serbian forces to board buses to take them out of the country.

The law on the entry of foreigners into Yugoslavia provides a process for granting permanent asylum and for government assistance to persons granted that right. In practice, Yugoslavia almost never grants permanent asylum or provides assistance to refugees. In 1991, however, Yugoslav federal and republic authorities decided to grant refugee status to about 2,000 Albanians of Montenegrin and Macedonian ethnic origin. In general, it continued to be Yugoslav policy to extend only temporary asylum to refugees who, with the assistance of the U.N. High Connissloner for Refugees (UNHCR). seek permanent resettlement in third countries. During the first S months of 1991, the IJNHCR recognized as genuine refugees 170 asylum seekers. 716 of whom were from Albania.

All asylum seekers who are caught entering Yugoslavia without passports or visas serve a 1—month jail sentence- for ?illegal border crossing? and are ?prescreened? by Yugoslav authorities before being presented to the UNHCR. In January 1991 alone, the Yugoslav authorities forcibly returned 365 Albanians to their country of origin without reference to the UNHCR, including several who had been already approved for the U.S. refugee program. The UNHCR expressed its concern to the Yuqoslav Government about these returns, as well as about the absence of procedural or legal safeguards during the Yugoslav ?prescreening? process. Also of concern were credible reports that refugees were beaten, some of them seriously, by Yugoslav police.

At year?s end, nearly 600,000 persons had been displaced by ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia. They were predominantly ethnic Serbs and Croats from contested areas of Croatia and Bosnia— Herzegovina but also included ethnic Hungarians and other minorities fleeing towns and Villages where another ethnic group had secured a dominant position. An estimated 40,000 Yugoslav citizens, mostly ethnic Croats and Hungarians, were estimated to have taken refuge in Hungary. The rest of the 600,000 displaced persons remained within Yugoslav borders. The ICRC and the UNHCR assisted governments of the republics in providing for these persons. Over two-thirds of whom are women and children.

Section 3Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change their Government

All six constituent republics were headed by leaders elected In republic—level multiparty elections held in 1990. International observers found all of these elections, with the exception of those in Serbia, to have been consistent generally with democratic rules and procedures. In Serbia. Croatia, and Montenegro, the republic presidents held extensive executive power. In Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina. and Macedonia, power— sharing among ethnic groups or with the legislature made for a more diffused decision making process. Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared autonomous enclaves independent of the republics.

Abusing the 1974 constitutional provision giving the autonomous provinces an egual voice in the collective Presidency. Serbia installed its own choices to represent Kosovo and Vojvodina and used these votes, together with the regular support of Montenegro, to exercise a decisive blocking role in the Presidency. The Serbian-led bloc in the Presidency sought in May to deny Croatian representative Stipe Mesic his turn as the head of the rotating Presidency. Under intense domestic and international pressure. Mesic was finally seated. After the opening of the armed conflict, slovenia and Croatia walked out of the Presidency. Mesic declared several months later that the JNA was acting in Croatia not at the behest of the Presidency but on its own and that a de facto coup had taken place. In October the Serbian—led bloc created a rump Presidency by altering procedural rules concerning quorums and the number of votes required for decision making. The Croatian, Slovenian, Bosnia-Herzegovinian. and Macedonian representatives refused to participate in the rump Presidency and denied its legitimacy, as did Federal Prime Minister Markovic and a number of foreign governments. In December Mesic resigned as President of the Federal Presidency, and in a separate action Markovic resigned as Federal Prime Minister.

Although there is legal equality of the sexes under Yugoslav law, informal and customary barriers exist to women?s participation in politics. There is less female participation in the leadership of the governments of the new republics than existed under the federal regime.

Section 4Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of human Rights

Over 24 human rights organizations are registered at the federal and republic levels. Some are considered political parties; many concentrate on specific ethnic or minority rights issues. According to Yugoslav human rights leaders, the activities of these groups in 1991 suffered not so much due to government repression as to problems related to the breakdown of communications between the republics and to personal financial hardships as a result of the Yugoslav economic collapse. In the latter part of the year. as human rights groups in Serbia became increasingly identified with the antiwar movement, pressures against them increased. Several antiwar and human rights activists were told that military mobilization notices had been Issued to them, and at least one person was actually ?selectively? conscripted. There were also instances of death threats and vandalism against individuals and facilities, which went unpunished by the Serbian police.

Federal and republic authorities generally accepted and often welcomed investigations by international human rights groups. A rapporteur mission from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe arrived in Yugoslavia in December and traveled throughout the country, meeting with federal and republic—level officials as well as opposition and human rights figures. They sought the assistance of the 1CRC In dealing with displaced persons and cooperated in ICRC prison visits to political prisoners. After initial reluctance, the Serbian government and the JNA accepted the European Community?s Observer Missions in Yugoslavia. and the Croatian President repeatedly pledged that he would welcome international monitoring and implementation of guarantees for Serbs living in Croatia.

Several governments of republics established human rights offices; Croatia?s parliamentary committee for human rights was increasingly active. These governments, sensitive to criticism of their human rights records, accused human rights advocates of disloyalty for questioning off iclal connitment to human rights. Ethnic Albanian human rights activists in Kosovo are routinely harassed by police.

Section 5DiscrimInation Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

The Federal Constitution of 1974 provided that each of the six ?nations? of Yugoslavia–Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Muslim, Macedonian, and Montenegrin should be the majority nation in its republic. It also provided for two autonomous provinces within the republic of Serbia—-Kosovo and Vojvodina in which the Albanian, Hungarian, and other minorities would enjoy broad.

Individual and group rignts. in Kosovo where the Albanians totaled more than 90 percent of the population. Albanians controlled the Communist party and government. In Vojvodina Hungarians and Romanians were among the minorities with the tight to have schools in their languages, as well as their newspapers, cultural associations, and radio programs.

Since 1989 the Serbian rerublic?s policy has been to take away the powers of the Kosovo government from the Albanians and to assert Serbian domination over all aspects of life. This policy has led to unrestrained discrimination against Albanians In every area, including medical care and social services, employment, and education. In 1991 at least 430 professors and other professional staff were dismissed from Pristina University on a variety of pretexts, including charges of using the Albanian language for official work. Most of Kosovo?s Albanian—language primary and secondary schools were closed because Albanian teachers (who are mostly Muslim) refused to implement the Serbian republic?s curriculum, which mandates the teaching of Serbian and Christian Orthodox cultural themes. At least 6,000 Albanian teachers have been fired for this refusal. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro also suffered discrimination in education and political expression. Albanian human rights activists claimed that scores of Albanian youths serving in the JNA died under unexplained and suspicious circumstances in 1991.

The rights of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina came under pressure from Serbian authorities who denounced ethnic Hungarian publications and political groups as ?anti—Serb.? The publication of the Hungarian-language weekly Magyar Szo was in question, and Hungarian-language radio programs on Hovi Sad radio were canceled. In August SerbIa introduced a new language law which gave the Serbian government added power to restrict the use of minority languages, including Hungarian and Albanian.

Reports of discrimination against Serbian residents of Croatia increased in 1991. Ethnic Serbs working at non-governmental jobs who refused to sign loyalty oaths to Croatia were often fired. Vandalism and violence against Serbs and their property in Croatia also increased. Although Croatian authorities investigated many such Incidents and the state insurance company paid claims on them, culprits were almost never identified and punished. The Croatian government also imposed special, higher taxes on property in Croatia owned by residents of Serbia, while properties and businesses in Serbia owned by Croats and Slovenes ware seized and their assets frozen. There were allegation of mass dismissals of Serbs in Croatia on ethnic grounds; although some dismissals did appear to have occurred on ethnic grounds, Croatian authorities claimed that in most cases they were for cause or were due to the economic downturn. In December the Croatian parliament passed a sweeping law granting increased autonomy to communities of ethnic minorities in Croatia; implementation of that law, however, was in large part impossible due to the war and the loss of Croatian governmental control over the affected areas.

Gypsies have complained that the rights extended to other minorities have not been extended to them. Gypsies in Yugoslavia do appear to suffer discrimination in employment, social services, and education. There is a Gypsy cultural organization. and the president of the World Romany Federation is a Yugoslav Gypsy. in Macedonia, there is a Gypsy political party with one representative in the legislature.

The Federal Constitution provides for the equality of citizens regardless of sex. However, increasing rates of unemployment throughout Yugoslavia and insufficient social welfare programs due to the economic crisis affected women disproportionately.

Increasing public attention is being paid to the problem of violence against women. Ilotlines operating a few hours a day exist for bettered women in major Yugoslav cities. Legal penalties for spouse abuse are the same as those for assault on other persons, but the abused spouse must file a complaint, and this is seldom done. There are feminist groups in the larger cities of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia campaigning for improvement in women?s rights.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a.The Right of Association

All workers. except military personnel, are entitled to form or join unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. National statistics for 1991 ott the size of the organized work force are not reliable. in the past. the Federal Government claimed that the majority of the work force was enrolled in the format trade union system, with dues being automatically deducted from workers? salaries. Workers are no longer formally obligated to register with and pay dues to the official unions. However, many do so because of the advantages of some material benefits and the pressure to conform.

Given the breakdown of the federal system, the national labor federation, the Council of Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CITUY). has increasingly become an empty shell as a federal body. While it is organized by republic and by industry and in theory each republic and autonomous province has two seats on the Federal Council of the CITUY. Croatia and Slovenia no longer send representatives. Just as the federal structure has come increasingly under Serbian domination, the CITUT has grown close to the Serbian government and the Socialist Party of Serbia.

New trade unions were formed in 1991 as the centralized national federation structure eroded. Workers, both in blue—collar and white—collar workplaces, left the pro-government CITUY or its successor republic—level organizations and formed independent local and republic trade unions, particularly in Slovenia. Croatia. and Serbia. In July a group of independent workers announced the formation of a trade union central called the Independent Branch Trade Unions of Serbia (IBTUS), better known as Nezavisnost (Independence). which includes independent teamsters, journalists, metalworkers, university workers, teachers, and others who left the Council of Independent Trade Unions of Serbia. Individual managers and enterprises often coerced or fired workers attempting to participate in such organizing activities. Nezavisnost PresIdent Bronisiav Canak, a journalist at Delgrade Radio—Television, was threatened with suspension from his job. and about 25 other Nezavisnost activists were fired from other enterprises for their union activities.

In Kosovo it is difficult to distinguish between discrimination against an ethnic group and against a trade union. Although the Federal Government formally recognized the Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (ITUK) in flay. the new organization continued to face huge barriers at the local level in representing a work force that suffered from official repression and repeated mass dismissals on ethnic grounds. Serbian ?special measures? have generally included suspension of workers councils and elimination, or at lean severe restriction, of the right of workers to engage in normal trade union activities. ITUK officials and activities have frequently been subject to harassment by the authorities. For example, in September two ITUK officials were sentenced to 60 days in prison, in part for trade union activities. It was estimated in October that come 50.000 Kosovo Albanian families were without a wage earner and that total dismissals of Albanian workers exceeded 75,000.

The right to strike Is recognized and was widely exercised throughout Yugoslavia. Some 95 percent of strikes in Serbia were said to be legally organized, that is. in compliance with the Serbian law which requires a 30—day notification and limits strike activities to the affected enterprise.

In June some 45.000 metalworkers in Bosnia—Herzegovina walked of f their jobs to demand payment of guaranteed wages and tax relief for ailing industries. They were later joined in solidarity strikes by other metalworkers (130,000) and some 150,000 in construction, transportation, and woodworking industries, as well as by 35,000 teachers. Their protest ended following government promises of salary support and economic changes.

The CITUY. which abandoned the Moscow—dominated World Federation of Trade Unions decades ago, has observer status in the World Confederation of Labor and has applied for membership in the European Trade Union Confederation. The new republic federations, particularly in Siovenia and Croatia, state they no longer wish to have federal organizations represent them internationally.

b.The Right to Organize and Dargain Collectively

Western—style collective bargaining does not yet exist in Yugoslavia. A 1969 law on labor relations introduced the concept of “collective agreements” to be negotiated between the unions and the semiofficial Chambers of Economy. but unions found it difficult to identify the authorities with management responsibility for negotiating contracts. Questions persist as -to the enforcement of such contracts or agreements, property ownership, and the independence of management. Wages are set generally at the factory or enterprise level by workers councils representing management and labor. Each )ob is graded by ?points? and salaries arranged hierarchically. Protection for unions is provided by both federal and republic laws, which, however, have not caught up with the recent changes. Yugoslavia is now in transition from its?old system of official unions? to a mixed one in which new independent groups of workers exist alongside the old ?reformed? organizations. Ethnically based dismissals and persecution of union activists remain problems.

There are no export processing zones.

c.Prohibition of Forced ox Compulsory Labor The Federal Constitution prohibits forced labor, and this prohibition appears to be respected.

d.Minimum Age for the employment of Children

The minimum age for child labor is 16. although in village and farm communities, younger children often assist with faintly agricultural obligations. Enforcement is carried out by the Federal and Republic Secretariats for Labor, Health, and Social Policy.

e.Acceptable Conditions of Work

Minimum wages are guaranteed by federal law, but there were many instances in 1991 in which workers were not paid their wages on time or in full and waited several months before receiving their salaries. These arrearages occurred frequently in both the private and public sectors. The official workweek is listed as 42 hours. During the economic slowdown in 1991, however, a number of enterprises, actually operated for fewer hours. Enterprise work forces are also often divided into A? and ?B” lists and ?platoons? on a 2-week schedule in order to reduce costs. There are generous sick leave and vacation benefits.

Yugoslavia has extensive federal and republic laws and regulations on occupational health and safety. Enforcement of work safety rules, however, is lax.