State Department Letter to Joseph J. DioGuardi

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520June5, 1991

Mr. Joseph DioGuardi
President
Albanian American Civic League
50 Baraud Road
Scarsdale, New York 10583

Dear Mr. DioGuardi:

I am responding to your letter of May 23, 1991 to Secretary Baker regarding the Administration’s approach to Section 599A of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act, 1991 (the Nickles—Bentley Amendment).

I have enclosed for your information a copy of the public statement issued on May 24 by the State Department concerning overall U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, our strong concerns with regard to the conduct of the Serbian republic leadership, and the Secretary?s decision to invoke the discretionary waiver authority of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment.

The intent of the measures announced on May 24 is to underscore the danger of international isolation faced by those in Yugoslavia who would resort to repression, violence and unconstitutional means to achieve their political aims. We intend to review the above measures in light of the further progress of Yugoslavia and its constituent republics toward full respect for CSCE principles, both with respect to human rights and to the peaceful and democratic settlement of disputes.

The human rights situation in Kosovo must be an integral part of a peaceful and democratic resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. We believe that coordinated approaches to this problem among CSCE members will be mutually reinforcing, as have been our recent parallel demarches with the European Community in opposition to the use of force and in favor of a democratic, unified Yugoslavia achieved through dialogue. We also see continued pressure through the CSCE Human Dimensions Mechanism process as a particularly effective way to bring home to Yugoslav and Serbian authorities the depth and breadth of international concern about the Kosovo situation.

Sincerely,
Richard G. Johnson
Country Officer for Yugoslavia
Office of Eastern European
and Yugoslav Affairs

U.S. POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA

——The provisions of the Nickles—Bentley Amendment, which entered into effect on May 5, establish certain conditions for U.S. assistance to Yugoslavia as well as discretionary waiver authority for the Administration in implementing the Amendment. The Administration has examined its response to the provisions of the Nickles—Bentley Amendment against the background of the ongoing and still intensifying crisis in Yugoslavia.

——U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia is based on support for the interrelated objectives of democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reform, and unity.

——By democracy we mean that all citizens of Yugoslavia should enjoy democratic rights and civil liberties, and be able to represent themselves through free and fair elections.

——By dialogue we mean that disputes between republics, ethnic groups, or individuals should be resolved only through peaceful means. We would be strongly opposed to any use of force or intimidation to settle political differences, change external or internal borders, block democratic change, or impose a nondemocratic unity.

——By human rights, we mean the standards of behavior laid down in international commitments to which Yugoslvia is a party, including the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent CSCE documents. We attach particular importance to the provisions relating to the treatment of members of minorities.

——By market reforms, we mean that we support Yugoslavia?s transition to a full market economy, open to private ownership and investment.

——By unity we mean the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia within its present borders. We believe that the ethnic heterogeneity of most Yugoslav republics means that any dissolution of Yugoslavia is likely to exacerbate rather than resblve ethnic tensions.

——We believe that unity, to be preserved, must be put on a new, democratic, mutually agreed basis. This can only be achieved through dialogue and the furtherance of democratic processes.

The U.S. will not encourage or reward secession; it will respect any framework, federal, confederal, or other, on which the people of Yugoslavia peacefully and democratically decide. We firmly believe that Yugoslavia?s external or internal borders should not be changed unless by peaceful consensual means.

——Whether or not these five objectives are realized in Yugoslavia depends primarily on the people of Yugoslavia and their leaders at the republic and federal levels. The key factor in their ability to do so is the consolidation of peaceful, democratic dialogue as the mechanism for addressing their differences.

——The consolidation of peaceful, democratic dialogue has therefore been the main thrust of U.S. bilateral and multilateral diplomacy over the past year, along with support for a democratic, unified Yugoslavia that fully respects human rights and that addresses thedifficult decisions involved in market reform.

Over this period, Yugoslavia as a whole has made significant progress toward observance of CSCE principles, and the Yugoslav people and their leaders have preserved a commitment to dialogue under increasingly difficult circumstances.

——However, progress toward a democratic, unified Yugoslavia achieved through dialogue has been increasingly threatened by a rise in ethnic tensions that threatens to reverse Yugoslavia?s transition to democracy and free markets.

——The U.S. strongly supports timely completion of the transfer of constitutional authority by the normal Presidential rotation to Stipe Mesic.

——The Serbian leadership?s efforts to block the constitutional transfer of authority within the collective Yugoslav Presidency are inconsistent with democratic principles and threaten disintegration and civil conflict.

——Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic and Stipe Mesic have sought to resolve this impasse constitutionally. Their efforts are critical to the continuity of Yugoslav federal authority and to further ali—Yugoslav democratic and market reform.

——The U.S. supports these efforts, and will continue to press strongly, both bilaterally and in parallel with others in the international community, for a constitutional transfer of authority in the Yugoslav Presidency.

——We hold the leadership of the Serbian Republic responsible for the crisis in the Yugoslav Presidency, which can only be interpreted as a deliberate effort to exacerbate the political situation and raise the odds of disintegration and violence.

The conduct of the leadership of the Serbian Republic, both with respect to elections and to human rights, has also been in contrast to Yugoslavia?s overall progress toward CSCE principles, in the context of the Nickles—Bentley Amendment.

——We believe there have been serious flaws in the electoral process in the Serbian Republic.

——Although the December 1990 election was a significant improvement over any held in Serbia in over 50 years, the electoral campaign was characterized by severe imbalances between access to the media and access to official sources of funding for the ruling and opposition parties. Republican authorities exhausted public resources to ameliorate the economic situation during the campaign, and subsequently made an illegal incursion into the Yugoslav monetary supply estimated at $1.8 billion to compensate for those expenditures. Republican authorities have also sought. to perpetuate their control over the media in the aftermath of the election, making only grudging concessions to massive protests in favor of a free flow of information.

——?The holding of free and fair elections, like the free flow of information, is a measure of a government?s commitment to a democratic political process; we do not believe that the present Serbian leadership has fully demonstrated such a commitment.

——We assess the violations of human rights by Serbian authorities in Kosovo Province as extremely grave. There is a deteriorating cycle of action and reaction in the context of a fundamental political conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Basing its claim to Kosovo primarily on historical grounds, Serbia is seeking to reestablish its control over Kosovo through repressive means which clearly violate CSCE principles. The majority ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo bases its claim to autonomy within the province on ethnic grounds, and, in the face of Serbian repression, has escalated its demands since mid—1990 to insist on republican status separate from Serbia.

——In the province of Kosovo, Serbian authorities continued and intensified repressive measures that featured in 1990 thousands of political arrests, tens of thousands of politically motivated job dismissals, and widespread police violence against ethnic Albanians. This violence included the use of excessive force by the police to disperse peaceful demonstrators, including random and at times unprovoked shooting by the police, resulting in at least 30 deaths and hundreds of injured.

Human rights abuses by the Serbian authorities against the majority Albanian population in Kosovo have continued thus far in 1991. Albanians are arrested, beaten, and otherwise harassed for attempting to exercise basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly. Principal provincial government organs remain shut down and most government functions have been taken over by Serbs appointed from Belgrade. Albanian media organs remain closed, persons attempting to bring in Albanian language publications printed outside Kosovo are sometimes harassed. Many Albanian-language schools in Kosovo have been closed because of a refusal by teachers and pupils to use a new curriculum imposed by Serbia, and Serbian administrators almost completely dominate the Pristina University Rectorate and some individual faculties, and many ethnic Albanian professors have been fired or driven out.

——The ability of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to pursue their interests through the political process has been further curtailed by the Serbian government?s abolition of the Presidency and Executive Council of Kosovo Province and by its replacement of Kosovo Province?s representative on the federal Presidency.

——Meanwhile, official Serbian arguments that Serbian policies in Kosovo are directed only against ethnic Albanian separatism from Serbia (and potentially from Yugoslavia to join neighboring Albania) have become to some extent a self—fulfilling prophecy: ethnic Albanians and their leaders in Kosovo have grown increasingly insistent on achieving a Republic separate from Serbia, and have boycotted opportunities, like the Serbian elections in December 1990, to participate in the Serbian political process.

——There is also some concern in 1991 about human rights abuses in the Republic of Croatia. Serbian activists there have asserted that significant numbers of Serbs (some 11 percent of the Republic?s population) have been fired from official positions in republican organs, especially the police, and from some public sector enterprises, solely on ethnic grounds.

——Serbs also assert that they are sometimes subject to arrest, physical attacks, or other harassment by Croatian authorities. Serbian citizens of Croatia are also concerned at the prospect that Croatia might secede from Yugoslavia, thus cutting them off from their current country and Serbia against their will.

The situation in Croatia, however, is complicated by the existence of Serbian nationalist leaders who are attempting, including by use of armed force, to separate parts of Croatia from republican authority, and who have rejected repeated and unconditional offers of dialogue by Croatian authorities. There are also widespread reports that Croats living in Serbian—inhabited parts of Croatia are subject to arrest, attacks, and harassment by Serbs.

——We support the principles that underlie the Nickles—Bentley Amendment, and aim to ensure that our assistance is closely tied to democratic and market reform and respect for human rights. In considering the implementation of this Amendment, however, we need to be careful not to hit the wrong target.

For this reason, the Administration has decided to take the following steps: (i) the Secretary of State has invoked the certification mechanism of the Nickles—Bentley Amendment; (ii) the U.S. will resume assistance to Yugoslavia on a selective basis; and (iii) the U.S. will invoke Step Two of the CSCE Human Dimensions Mechanism with regard to human rights violations in Serbia, and urge other CSCE members to follow suit; in addition, due to underwriting concerns relating to human righis and other problems in the Serbian Republic, OPIC will suspend assistance to new U.S. investments in the Serbian Republic.