Kosova: To Be Or Not To Be – DioGuardi

 

KOSOVA:TO BE OR NOT TO BE

by Hon. Joseph J. DioGuardi

United States policy toward disintegrating Yugoslavia has now taken a dramatic turn. Last October Congress passed and the President signed the Foreign Assistance Act, containing the Nickles Amendment. This amendment, conceived, promoted and lobbied into existence by the Albanian American Civic League, required the U.S. government, after six months, to cut off direct aid and oppose IMF and World Bank aid to Yugoslavia until the Secretary of State certified that the Yugoslav government is adhering to its obligations under the Helsinki Accords.

On May 19, 1991 the New York Times reported that Secretary of State James A.Baker had concluded that he could not make the certification. The main reason given was the continuing, brutal repression of almost two million ethnic Albanians in Serbia’s southern province of Kosova. An anonymous State Department official was quoted as saying ?this is a big turning point? in U.S.— Yugoslav relations.

On May 25 the New York Times reported that Secretary Baker had changed his mind. He apparently felt once again that the preservation of the Yugoslav state (under Prime Minister Markovic) was more important than the political and human rights of the Albanian people of Kosova. And, in my opinion, he wrongly certified the uncertifiable under the Nickles Amendment.

In so doing the Secretary did make it clear, however, that Serbia will still be penalized under the Foreign Assistance Act. And he sternly rebuked the Serbian authorities? for their repressive measures against the Albanian people of Kosova.

“Mbahu, Néno, mos kij friké, seke djemtè n’Amerike!”
Fan S. Noli

 

Many scholars and astute observers agree that the concept of rewarding only those republics that have held free and fair elections and that promote democratic change, as also spelled out in legislation sponsored by Sen. Bob Dole, is Politically sound morally correct, necause it sends a strong message to the hardlinersof Serbia and Montenegro who their Communist garb.

Yet for the Albanians in Kosova the problem is more complicated. They do not have their ?republic? recognized, and thus are treated as only a part of Serbia. As things stand now, even our assistance (speaking hypothetically) to even a potentially democratic Serbia woould again exclude Albanians in Kosova, since it has been hiàtorically proven that Serbia does not want to see the full development of Kosova.

Albanians in Yugoslavia, three million of them, are caught in a very difficult dilemma. While they wish to see Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign jurisdictions, for example, because such sovereignty would protect these two northern republics from Serbian interference and possible domination, a loosely knit Yugoslavia (or a dissolved Yugoslavia) would at the same time leave Albanians alone at the mercy of Serbia with no balancing support from Croatia and Slovenia.

I have concluded for these reasons that barring any unexpected developments in Yugoslavia which would improve dramatically the present position of the Albanian population there, it is still in the interest of the Albanians to see a federated Yugoslavia, democratic and responsive to all her peoples? needs and interests. In such a situation, free and fair elections should inevitably produce the establishment of a ?Republic of Kosova?, freely arrived at and legally recognized as an equal and independent unit within the framework of a federal Yugoslavia. Such a development would place Kosova on the same footing with the other republics.

At the same time, I believe that the Bush Administration, at least for the time being, should not respond to appeals for direct aid to democratic Croatia and Slovenia. If such aid were granted, the U.S. would lose all leverage to improve the plight of the Albanians, who would be left to the mercies of their Serbian overlords.

For their part, the Croatians and Slovenians must demand that Kosova be given republic status within Yugoslavia, so that the democratic voice of the Albanian Kosovars can be added to their own in the nation?s councils. Only in this way will the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state be preserved, and the cause of democracy and human rights advanced in accordance with the Bush Administration?s goals.

In light of the difficult political situation faced by the Kosovars and for all the life—threatening reasons given above, I believe the Albanian American Civic League is acting responsibly and with great caution in serving the interests of the three million Albanians in Yugoslavia. The League may be criticized for not totally supporting the foreign policy objectives, legislative positions and political agenda of the Bush Administration, the Congress, and the other democratic, ?recognized? republics of Yugoslavia, respectively.

We must, however, courageously pursue a policy which puts the security of three million Albanians first, in view of the life or death nature of the situation in Kosova and throughout Yugoslavia. To paraphrase a great Western statesman, when it comes to the struggle of the people of Kosova to become a democratic and ?recognized? republic, ?if not us, who? And if not now, when??

Albanians must act boldly — and now — in pursuit of their own agenda. The Albanian American Civic League and over three hundred thousand Albanians in America, stronger than ever, stand ready to help our Albanian brothers and sisters in Kosova in any way we can. To succeed we must work together, with a common strategy, speak with one powerful voice, protect our hard—won gains, and give strong and dependable support to those who stand with us in defense of liberty, democracy, and human rights.

 

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Former Congressman Joseph J. DioGuardi of Westchester County, New York, is

President of the Albanian American Civic League.

May 28, 1991

 

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