Claiborne Pell’s Trip to Yugoslavia

April 29, 1991

Dear Joe:

Enclosed is the report on my trip to Albania and Yugoslavia.

I would welcome any questions or comments you may have. It was great to see-you in Tirana.

Warm regards.
Ever sincerely,

Claiborne Pell

YUGOSLAVIA

The national divisions that threaten to tear Yugoslavia apart or plunge it into civil war are deepening. Efforts to reach an agreement to? restructure and preserve this federation of six republics and two autonomous regions are at an impasse, and the prospects for success are not encouraging.

The unity and stability of Yugoslavia are foundering on the Serbian Republic?s dogged persistence in preserving an almost Stalinist political and economic system and its refusal to accept economic reform, the restoration of political and huiuan rights in the Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo and any loosening of federation ties with its increasingly democratic sister republics. Four of Yugoslavia?s six constituent republics have elected non—communist governments dedicated to economic reform. They have also issued declarations of sovereignty, which they threaten to act oii if the federation is not restructured to provide greater political and economic autonomy to the individual republics.

The northwestern republics of Slovenia and Croatia have taken the lead in pressing for change, and Slovenia is the closest to declaring itself an independent state. Slovenia held a referendum last December during which 90% of the population voted in favor of independence if federal constitutional changes were not agreed to by June 23. The President of the Federal Executive Council (Prime Minister), Ante Markovic, is struggling to keep alive his program of economic ref ornis, which have been so widely praised in the West, and to find some acceptable formula for political reform that could preserve a unified country. In this daunting task, he has few tools beyond personal good will; and he. seems to conspicuously lack any political mandate or following that can counter the immensely powerful nationalist sentiments in the republics.

?rhe roots of Yugoslavia?s current crisis go back to the Tito years, when the dictator from Croatia denied Serbia the pre-eminence that it enjoyed during the two pre-Worid War II decades. In 1974, Tito wrote a new constitution to guide the country after his death. It provided for a balance of power among the various republics, but created weak national institutions, including a collective presidency with almost no powers. Most galling to the Serbs was the creation of two antonomous provinces within Serbia -— Kosovo in the south and

Vojvodina in the north, each having virtually all of the attributes of republic status except the name.

After Tito’s death in 1980, Serbia saw an opportunity to recover the dominant position it enjoyed during the pre—war period. Serbian security forces brutally broke up student demonstrations in 1981 in Kosovo, where the population is 90% ethnic Albanian, and began a systematic campaign to reassert Serbian political, economic and social dominance in the province.

The Agony of Ethnic Albanians.

Serbian nationalism gained momentum in 19813 when Slobodan Milosevic wrested control of the Serbian League of Communistq, charging his predecessor with being too soft on Kosovo and insufficiently aggressive in asserting Serbia’s rights nationwide. In March 1989, the Serbian constitution was amended, withdrawing virtually all of the autonomous powers previously enjoyed by Kosovo and Vojvodina. In June 1990, the Kosovo Assembly met to repudiate the Serbian actions and declare its determination to seek republic status for Kosovo. Serbia responded by arresting members of the Assembly, closing down all of the Albanian language media, occupying the university and declaring martial law.

The people of Kosovo responded with passive resistance, including symbolic strikes, and a boycott of the December 1990 Serbian elections. The Slovenian and Croatian governments strongly condemned the Serbian actions, citing them as one of their reasons for seeking a fundamental restructuring of the Yugoslav federation.

On April 2, I met in Macedonia with the principal ethnic Albanian leaders of Kosovo. They painted a grim picture of Serbian repression, which they said was getting worse every day. Some examples are as follows:

–Arbitrary arrests, torture and searches are an everyday occurrence, and some 90 Albanians were killed during peaceful demonstrations in 1990.

–Serbian administrators have been appointed in 70% of Kosovo?s industry, and some 53,000 Albanian workers have been dismissed.

——Albanians are being forced out of their apartments, and land is being taken away from farmers.

——Albanian language instruction in schools has been drastically curtailed. Many schools remain closed, as are the Albanian language media.

– Albanian political parties are not allowed to operate normally, and many party leaders have been jailed.

Kosovo’s Albanians see these acts as part of a concerted campaign to make life so unpleasant for Albanians that they will leave and be replaced by Serbs. Many Albanians have emigrated; but despite encouragement from the Serbian government, few Serbs have taken their place. The Albanians also fear that Serbia hopes to provoke a violent reaction to its oppression so that a bloody crackdown can be ordered.

Kosovo’s political leaders have been successful to date in their campaign of non-violent resistance, but they fear that an explosive reaction could occur at any time despite their efforts. I was told that if a conflict occurs, it would be a massacre.

In response to my question about the Albanian opposition’s objectives, I was told that after ten years of repression, Albanians would not be satisfied with a restoration of their autonomous status within Serbia. They want republic status equal to that of the six existing republics, and they hope to achieve that through dialogue with Serbia and with full respect for the rights of Serbs in Kosovo. So far, however, Serbia refuses to engage in any dialogue. I was told further that Kosovo wants to remain within a united, democratic Yugoslavia, but if the country breaks up, Albanians would not live in a rump “Serboslavia”.

I also met with leaders of the Albanian conununity in Macedonia, where Albanians comprise somewhere between 20% and 40% of the population. While the treatment of Albanians is better in Macedonia than it is in Kosovo, there are problems.

Unlike Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia’s Albanians voted in last year?s republic elections, which produced .~ government with a non-communist majority. The Albanians had high hopes for democracy in Macedonia, but they feel that conditions for them have been far worse than they had hoped for under democracy.

I was told that ethnic Macedonian parties held well over two—thirds of the seats in the new parl-iament, and they seem to take a united front in opposition to Albanian interests. For example, legislation enacted in March requires secondary school records to be written only in the Macedonian language using the Cyrillic alphabet, even in schools where the language of instruction is Albanian. In some areas, Albanian communities have been prohibited from having Albanian language schools even though unemployed Albanian teachers have offered to teach for free.

There is an across—the-board tightening of Albanian language instruction. In 1981, for example, there were 39 Albanian secondary schools in Macedonia; now there are only five. Albanians are also riot allowed to give certain Albanian names to their children or to use Albanian geographical names in areas where they are a majority. Finally, in two municipalities where Albanians had won a large majority in local elections, they have not been allowed to form local governments because of opposition from the Macedonian minority.

Iasked whether Albanians in Macedonia wanted autonomous status, and I was told that they did not, that they only wanted equal treatment. In this regard, my Albanian interlocutprs complained that Albanians had more cultural rights in l4acedonia under the Turks and Communists than they do under democracy. They lamented that much of the recent recognition of. Macedonia?s ethnic identity has been at the expense of Albanians.

The Situation in Macedonia

In this latter connection, Macedonians complained of decades of abuse from Serbia, which, until Tito gave republic status to Macedonia, refused to respect Macedonia?s separate cultural and linguistic identity. They also complained of discriminatory treatment of Macedonians in Greece. We were told, for example, that Macedonian cultural centers were forbidden, that expatriate Greek Macedonians were not permitted to return for visits, and that Greek census takers would not permit Macedonians to register their ethnic identity. Macedonians also fear that in the event Yugoslavia breaks up, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria will conspire to divide the republic among themselves. I received a shocked reaction when I responded that there might be greater sympathy for Macedonians if they treated ethnic Albanians better.

Iiimeetings with senior members of the Macedonian government, it was clear that they were exasperated not only by Serbian intransigence but also by what they considered to be irresponsible behavior on the part of the Slovenian and Croatian leadership. The Macedonians strongly support Prime Minister Markovic and believe that the most constructive way to reach a solution for the future of Yugoslavia was not by trying to resolve the issue of whether the country should be a federation or a confederation, but rather by seeking to reach agreement on the specific elements that a joint Yugoslav association should have. Discussions have been held on such specific elements, but their view is that these discussions have always broken down because of Croatian or

Slovenian insistence on the importance of nomenclature issues.
Macedonia wants very much to keep Yugoslavia together; and the new government issued a declaration of sovereignty only because it felt that that was necessary for Macedonia to be an equal player in negotiations over Yugoslavia?s future. The Macedonian view is that Macedonia would stay in Yugoslavia as long as no one? forced it out.

The Serbian Point of View

In Belgrade, I met with Slobodan Milosevic, the President of the Republic of Serbia. Most of our conversation centered on the situation in Kosovo. Milosevic described Kosovo as the heart of Serbia, where many Serbian monasteries, cultural monuments and cemeteries are located and that consequently Kosovo could never be separated from Serbia. He was convinced that the Albanians in Kosovo are secessionists determined to become a part of a Greater Albania, despite the fact that both the govermnent?in Tirana and the leaders of all of Kosovo?s political parties and human rights groups firmly deny any interest in creating a Greater Albania.

I expressed strong concern about Serbian human rights violations in Kosovo, adding that many respected international organizations shared my view. Milosevic denied that there were any violations of Albanian human rights in Kosovo and said that the photographs of torture victims I had been shown in Skopje were fakes. Another Serbian official who was present in the meeting with Milosevic falsely stated that the European Parliament recently gave Serbia a clean bill of health regarding the treatment of Albanians in Icosovo. In fact, the European Parliament?s report confirmed all of the violations described to me by Kosovo?s Albanian leaders and called upon the Serbian government ?to abandon forthwith its repressive policy in Kosovo which is clearly aimed at destroying the cultural identity, the economy and the democratic rights of its Albanian inhabitants,? adding that the Kosovo situation placed Yugoslavia in violation of its CSCE obligations.

I said that I wanted to visit Kosovo on this trip but had concluded that if I had gone there the same abuse that occurred during Senator Dole?s August 1990 trip might be repeated. X?lilosevic replied that no one suffered during Senator Dole?s trip; Albanian separatists had portrayed his visit as a rescue mission and consequently demonstrations had to be banned for reasons of public safety. When I asked if there would be any objection to the establishment of a U.S. cultural center in Pristina, Milosevic said, ?why not? Serbia would welcome such a center, and it would be good.?

In our discussion of the Yugoslav unity question, Milosevic said that Serbia wants to resolve the problem in a peaceful and democratic fashion, but there are some in Yugoslavia who want to use the tactics of force and pressure. The best solution, he said, would be for all Yugoslav peoples to live together. Those peoples that wish to leave Yugoslavia should be able to do so, but only in a democratic fashion and on the basis of procedures that are the same throughout Yugoslavia. The most democratic and direct way would be through a referendum.

In response to my question about how this would apply to Serbs in Croatia, Milosevic said that where they lived in a compact mass, they could vote on the basis of their ethnic preference; others would become a national minority in a state with redrawn borders (something the Croatians said they would never accept). Milosevic did not address the inconsistency between his advocacy of separating Serbian enclaves from Croatia and his refusal to allow a similar choice for Albanians in Kosovo.

Milosevic also iuentioned the possibility of a voluntary exchange of peoples among republics. When I asked whether he knew of any voluntary exchanges anywhere in the world that could be considered as successful, he offered none, saying only that some kind of ?corrective measures? would be desirable.

The Travails of Prime Minister Markovic

While in Belgrade, I also met with the federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic. Markovic said he deeply appreciated President Bush?s letter of March 28, which expressed (a) support for Markovic?s political and economic reform program,
(b)U.S. opposition to the use of force or intimidation to resolve Yugoslavia?s problems, and (c) U.S. support for Yugoslavia?s unity (adding that the U.S. ?will not encourage or reward those who would break the country apart?). I registered my strong support for the President?s message and for Markovic?s reform program.

Markovic lamented that his once successful economic reform program was now a shambles, because the individual republics had negated it with irresponsible actions of their own. He said he would not give up, however, and still saw a chance to revive his political and econàmic?program. While admitting that there was a dangerous impasse, he drew hope from the fact that all of the competing ideas from the republics had been stalemated.

Regarding political reform, Markovic said that Yugoslavia could not exist as a ?unitary? state (presumably one in which republican boundaries would disappear or be rendered meaningless and in which Serbia would dominate); nor was a confederation (as advocated by Croatia and Slovenia) possible. Instead, he argued for a confederal/federal synthesis. I asked whether the Swiss model could be adapted to Yugoslavia?s situation, but Narkovic thought it would inevitably fail.

As the meeting drew to a close, I asked how the United States could be of help. Markovic responded by saying that the U.S. should continue to give support.to his reforms, but that more than words would be required. Specifically, he asked forU.S. support for his request to reschedule the $648 million in arrearages owed to Paris Club creditors. He added that his highest immediate priority was an INF standby arrangement.

What the Croats and Slovenes Want

The final- segment of my program in Yugoslavia was a visit to Croatia, where I met with both Croatian and Slovenian leaders. I was told that Croatia insisted on redefining Yugoslavia, because Serbia would always seek to dominate a federal state. Croats saw no prospect of designing any federal safeguards that would work against the Serbs, given their history and outlook. Other points made to me were as follows:

——Croatia already sees itself as a sovereign state and is anxious to negotiate a new arrangement with the other republics. It could never, however, accept Serbia?s referendum concept, because it would lead to a Sérbian—dominated federal state. The Croatian solution is a union of sovereign states with agreed upon common services and respect for current internal and external borders.

–Croatia will respect the rights of Serbs a~id other minorities. An overwhelming majority of Serbs in Croatia accep1~ the legitimacy of the new government and do not feel threatened. The dissident Serbs in the Krayina region are only 20% of Croatian Serbs and should not be threatening a democracy of 4.5 million. If they will just tell us what they want, we will give it to them; all we ask is that they agree to be part of Croatia. Everything else is negotiable.

——Economic reform is not solely dependent on Markovic. Croatia supported Markovic?s program but objected to his compromises to placate Serbia. Croatia rejects charges that it is moving, not to a free market, but to a state-controlled economy, Croatia is committed to a western-style free market system, but feels it has a better privatization plan than Markovic.
The Slovenian spokesmen echoed many of the Croatian views, but were stronger in expressing determination to go it alone as an independent state if the negotiations on redefining Yugoslavia failed. They pointed out that in a December 1990 referendum, 90% of Slovenians voted for independence if a new Yugoslav arrangement could not be negotiated in six months. That would make June 23, 1991 independence day.

I was told that the Slovenian government is bound by this plebiscite and must respect the results. To that end, the government is preparing the legal framework for an independent Slovenia, and everything will be ready by June 23 or even earlier. The Slovenes, however, do not seem to have thought through how they would fare economically outside of Yugoslavia?, but they are so hopeless about the future of Yugoslavia that they appear willing to run whatever risks are involved in independence.

These Slovenes consider Serbia so different from Slovenia and Croatia that even a democratic Serbia would be a problem. Co-existence with a Milosevic-led Serbia, however, is out of the question, I was told; and the situation in Kosovo was cited as an example of Milosevic?s attitude toward other nationalities.

As these Slovenes see it, Milosevic is presenting two unacceptable alternatives. One is a centralist, Serbia—dominated ?Serboslavia?t. The other is a Greater Serbia. In their judgment, Milosevic has given up on the fox~mer and is now concentrating on the latter, which would entail efforts to absorb parts of Bosnia and Croatia.

In the view of these Slovenes, there are only two acceptable options for them: a confederation, which Milosevic has rejected out of hand, and negotiations between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia. According to this latter approach, Slovenia would step aside and wait for the other five republics to develop a unified position and then Slovenia would negotiate with them as a group.

When I asked whether Slovenia didn?t consider that violence would be inevitable if it pulled out of the federation, I was told that Slovenia was already independent in all but name and that there will be bloodshed regardless of Slovenia?s status. I was also told that there was a problem with President Bush?s letter of March 26, which is perceived in Slovenia as emphasizing Yugoslav unity over democraCy such an ordering of priorities has been used by centralist forces and the army to conclude that they had Western support for intervening and restricting the rights of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

These Slovenian representatives also expressed annoyance with U.S. pressure to remain in Yugoslavia in order to spread the “germ of democracy.” Their response is “what’s in it for us?” They added that Slovenia doesn’t have the means to continue its missionary work, and in any event Serbs express resentment about preaching from Slovenia. Finally, they emphasized the uniqueness of Slovenia’s situation, saying that the Yugoslav problem was basically a conflict between Serbia and Croatia; and in this latter connection, they suggested that the CSCE Conflict Resolution Center in Vienna might be
?helpful.

Recommendations

——The President?s letter of March 28 is a sound basis for U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, but future statements should make it clearer that among Yugoslavia?s nationality problems is the suppression of human rights in Kosovo. Since Serbia considers ethnic Albanians to be a “national minority” rather than a “nationality”, a narrow interpretation of the President?s letter could convey the impression that Kosovo is outside the area of U.S. concern.

-—In this connection, the U.S. Information Agency should establish a cultural center in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Albanians constitute the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia, and renewed violence there could be the spark that ignites a wave of separatism throughout Yugoslavia. It is essential, in my view, that the United States have a permanent presence in Kosovo.

–Although the preservation of Yugoslav unity is desirable, at some point U.S. support for unity may prove to be incompatible with U.S. support for democracy, h~uman rights, reform and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The United States should not expect republics such as Slovenia and Croatia to wait forever for Serbia to accommodate them. Consequently, it is not too early for the Administration to begin to formulate policy options for dealing with a disintegrating Yugoslavia.

——U.S. economic policy toward Yugoslavia should be focused on strengthening Prime Minister Markovic in his pursuit of political and economic reforms. In this connection, serious consideration should be given to Markovic’s request for support in obtaining debt rescheduling and IMP standby assistance.
——U.S. economic policy toward Yugoslavia should also have a strong human rights element, particularly with regard to the situation in Kosovo. In this connection, the United States should make every effort to encourage development projects in Kosovo under which ethnic Albanians would obtain a proportionate share of the benefits. - In addition, U.S. influence should be used to ensure that funds from non-Yugoslav sources for development projects in Serbia are channeled through the federal government or through non-government—controlled Serbian entities that do not discriminate against non-Serbian ethnic communities.

–The Administration should pursue the Slovenian suggestion of involving the CSCE Center for Conflict Resolution in the resolution of nationality disputes in Yugoslavi4, including in Kosovo.